

DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SERVICE REGULATION  
BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION  
OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

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IN THE MATTER of NorthWestern Energy's	)	UTILITY DIVISION
Electric Supply Tracker Filings for the	)	
Periods July 1, 2007 through June 30, 2008	)	DOCKET NOS. D2008.5.45
and July 1, 2008 through June 30, 2009 and for	)	and D2009.5.62
the Forecasted Period July 1, 2009 through	)	
June 30, 2010.	)	

**Direct Testimony**  
**of**  
**John W. Wilson**  
**on Behalf**  
**of**  
**The Montana Consumer Counsel**

**September 18, 2009**

***J.W. Wilson & Associates, Inc.***

Economic Counsel

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**I. QUALIFICATIONS**

2 **Q. PLEASE STATE YOUR NAME, OCCUPATION, AND ADDRESS.**

3 A. My name is John W. Wilson. I am President of J.W. Wilson & Associates,  
4 Inc. Our offices are at 1601 North Kent Street, Suite 1104, Arlington,  
5 Virginia, 22209.

6 **Q. PLEASE OUTLINE YOUR EDUCATIONAL BACKGROUND.**

7 A. I hold a B.S. degree with senior honors and a Masters Degree in Economics  
8 from the University of Wisconsin. I have also received a Ph.D. in  
9 Economics from Cornell University. My major fields of study were  
10 industrial organization and public regulation of business, and my doctoral  
11 dissertation was a study of utility pricing and regulation.

12 **Q. HOW HAVE YOU BEEN EMPLOYED SINCE THAT TIME?**

13 A. After completing my graduate education I was an assistant professor of  
14 economics at the United States Military Academy, West Point, New York.  
15 In that capacity, I taught courses in both economics and government.  
16 While at West Point, I also served as an economic consultant to the  
17 Antitrust Division of the United States Department of Justice.

1 After leaving West Point, I was employed by the Federal Power  
2 Commission, first as a staff economist and then as Chief of FPC's Division  
3 of Economic Studies. In that capacity, I was involved in regulatory matters  
4 involving most phases of FPC regulation of electric utilities and the natural  
5 gas industry. Since 1973 I have been employed as an economic consultant  
6 by various clients, including federal, state, provincial and local  
7 governments, private enterprise and nonprofit organizations. This work has  
8 pertained to a wide range of issues concerning public utility regulation,  
9 insurance rate regulation, antitrust matters and economic and financial  
10 analysis. In 1975 I formed J. W. Wilson & Associates, Inc., a Washington,  
11 D.C. corporation.

12 **Q. WOULD YOU PLEASE DESCRIBE SOME OF YOUR**  
13 **ADDITIONAL PROFESSIONAL ACTIVITIES?**

14 A. I have authored a variety of articles and monographs, including a number of  
15 studies dealing with utility regulation and economic policy. I have  
16 consulted on regulatory, financial and competitive market matters with the  
17 Federal Communications Commission, the National Academy of Sciences,  
18 the Ford Foundation, the National Regulatory Research Institute, the  
19 Electric Power Research Institute, the U.S. Department of Justice Antitrust  
20 Division, the Federal Trade Commission Bureau of Competition, the

1 Commerce Department, the Department of the Interior, the Department of  
2 Energy, the Small Business Administration, the Department of Defense, the  
3 Tennessee Valley Authority, the Federal Energy Administration, and  
4 numerous state and provincial agencies and legislative bodies in the United  
5 States and Canada.

6 Previously, I was a member of the Economics Committee of the U.S. Water  
7 Resources Council, the FPC Coordinating Representative for the Task  
8 Force on Future Financial Requirements for the National Power Survey, the  
9 Advisory Committee to the National Association of Insurance  
10 Commissioners (NAIC) Task Force on Profitability and Investment  
11 Income, and the NAIC's Advisory Committee on Nuclear Risks.

12 In addition, I have testified as an expert witness in court proceedings  
13 dealing with competition in the electric power industry and on regulatory  
14 matters before more than 50 Federal and State regulatory bodies throughout  
15 the United States and Canada. I have also appeared on numerous occasions  
16 as an expert witness at the invitation of U.S. Senate and Congressional  
17 Committees dealing with antitrust and regulatory legislation. In addition, I  
18 have been retained as an expert on regulatory matters by more than 25 State  
19 and Federal regulatory agencies. I have also participated as a speaker,  
20 panelist, or moderator in many professional conferences and programs

1 dealing with business regulation, financial issues, economic policy and  
2 antitrust matters. I am a member of the American Economic Association  
3 and an associate member of the American Bar Association and the ABA's  
4 Antitrust, Insurance and Regulatory Law Sections.

5 **II. OVERVIEW OF TESTIMONY**

6 **Q. ON WHOSE BEHALF ARE YOU TESTIFYING IN THIS**  
7 **PROCEEDING?**

8 A. I am presenting testimony in this proceeding on behalf of the Montana  
9 Consumer Counsel (MCC).

10 **Q. PLEASE SUMMARIZE YOUR TESTIMONY?**

11 A. My testimony pertains to NorthWestern Energy's ("NWE" or "the  
12 Company") proposed cost recovery under its Electric Supply Tracker  
13 filings for the periods July 1, 2007 through June 30, 2008 and July 1, 2008  
14 through June 30, 2009, and for the forecasted period July 1, 2009 through  
15 June 30, 2010.

16 **Q. HAVE YOU REVIEWED THE COMPANY'S PROPOSED COST**  
17 **RECOVERY UNDER ITS ELECTRIC TRACKER FILINGS FOR**  
18 **THE TWELVE-MONTH PERIODS ENDING JUNE 30, 2008 AND**

1           **JUNE 30, 2009 AND FOR THE FORECASTED PERIOD ENDING**  
2           **JUNE 30, 2010?**

3    A.    Yes, I have. In addition to reviewing NWE's filings in this regard, I have  
4           also reviewed discovery responses provided by the company to data and  
5           information requests that have been made by the MCC and the Commission  
6           Staff.

7    **Q.    IS THE ELECTRIC SUPPLY COST RECOVERY PROPOSED BY**  
8           **NWE FOR THE 12-MONTH TRACKING PERIOD ENDED JUNE**  
9           **2008 REASONABLE?**

10   A.    In my opinion the Electric Supply cost recovery proposed by NWE for the  
11           12-month tracking period ended June 2008 is reasonable and should be  
12           approved by the Commission.

13                           **III.   ELECTRIC SUPPLY COST CHANGES**

14   **Q.    HAVE THE COMPANY'S ELECTRIC SUPPLY COSTS CHANGED**  
15           **SIGNIFICANTLY OVER THE THREE TRACKER YEARS**  
16           **REFLECTED IN THIS PROCEEDING?**

17   A.    On an overall basis the electric supply costs reported by the Company have  
18           remained nearly the same. The Company's average electric supply cost in  
19           the 2007/2008 tracker year was \$47.15/Mwh. In the 2008/2009 tracker

1 year the average cost increased slightly to \$48.55/Mwh, and in the  
2 estimated 2009/2010 tracker year it returned to \$47.06 – nearly the same  
3 average cost as in the 2007/2008 tracker year.

4 **Q. HAVE THE COMPONENTS OF THE COMPANY'S ELECTRIC**  
5 **SUPPLY REMAINED RELATIVELY STABLE OVER THESE**  
6 **THREE TRACKER YEARS?**

7 A. Yes. As shown in the table below, each of the major supply components  
8 accounts for approximately the same percentage of total electric supply in  
9 each of the three tracker years.

10 **Q. HAVE THE COSTS OF EACH OF THESE SUPPLY COMPONENTS**  
11 **REMAINED THE SAME OVER TIME?**

12 A. While the overall cost of electric supply has remained about the same over  
13 the three tracker years, the costs of some components have changed. For  
14 example, the cost of market transactions, which account for 27% to 29% of  
15 supply in each tracker year, declined significantly from nearly \$60/Mwh in  
16 the first two years to just over \$40/Mwh in the estimated 2009/2010 tracker  
17 year. In contrast to this market cost decline, NorthWestern's costs of other  
18 supply components had offsetting increases so that the Company's overall  
19 average supply cost remained relatively stable. Details on the amount and

1 cost of each electric supply component are shown in the following table for  
2 each of the three tracker years.

**Northwestern's Montana Electric Supply and Cost**  
2007 - 2010

	Tracker Year 2007/2008 (actual)		Tracker Year 2008/2009 (actual)		Tracker Year 2009/2010 (estimated)	
	%	\$/Mwh	%	\$/Mwh	%	\$/Mwh
PP&L Contract	35.41%	45.55	35.43%	47.15	35.60%	48.75
Market Transactions	26.84%	59.27	27.49%	58.66	29.37%	40.76
CU4	13.18%	36.20	12.85%	49.01	11.34%	68.91
QF Contracts	12.70%	33.89	12.98%	32.36	12.96%	34.98
Judith Gap	7.95%	37.94	7.43%	39.86	7.47%	43.54
Other*	3.91%	77.29	3.83%	59.27	3.26%	65.31
Total	100.0%	47.15	100.0%	48.55	100.0%	47.06

\* Includes: Tiber, J.P. Morgan, Powerex and Basin Creek.

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**IV. CLAIMED REVENUE LOSSES**

4 **Q. DOES THE COMPANY PROPOSE RATE ADDITIONS IN THE**  
5 **TRACKER FOR CU4 REVENUES THAT IT ESTIMATES WILL BE**  
6 **LOST DUE TO DEMAND SIDE MANAGEMENT (“DSM”)**  
7 **CONSERVATION PROGRAMS?**

1 A. Yes. The Company estimates that \$164,523 of Commission-authorized  
2 CU4 revenues were lost in the 2008-2009 tracker year and that another  
3 \$577,988 of Commission-authorized CU4 revenues will be lost in the 2009-  
4 2010 tracker year because of successful electricity conservation efforts  
5 under DSM programs.

6 **Q. DOES THE COMPANY ESTIMATE THAT WITHOUT THIS**  
7 **ADJUSTMENT, CU4 REVENUES WOULD BE LESS THAN CU4**  
8 **COSTS BECAUSE OF SUCCESSFUL DSM?**

9 A. No. The Company's fixed cost of service revenue requirement for CU4  
10 was determined by the Commission in Order 6925f in Docket No.  
11 D2008.6.69. The Company divided this annual fixed cost of service  
12 revenue requirement by 2007 test year kilowatt hours (kwh) sales to  
13 determine the per kwh charges that it includes in each customer's electric  
14 bill to cover the Commission's determined CU4 fixed cost of service of  
15 \$75,832,029. Because 2007 test year kwh sales were less than actual kwh  
16 sales in tracker year 2008/2009 and less than estimated kwh sales in tracker  
17 year 2009/2010, CU4 fixed cost revenues in each of these tracker years  
18 exceed the Commission's determined annual CU4 fixed cost of service.

19 **Q. THEN, WHY IS THE COMPANY PROPOSING RATE ADDITIONS**  
20 **IN THE TRACKERS FOR LOST CU4 REVENUES DUE TO DSM?**

1 A. The Company's argument is that without DSM, kwh sales would have been  
2 even larger than they were, resulting in even larger CU4 revenue  
3 increments above the Commission's determined CU4 fixed cost of service.  
4 So as not to discourage the Company's enthusiasm for its DSM efforts, the  
5 Company is asking the Commission to add back this lost surplus revenue as  
6 additional allowed tracker revenue, even though it is in excess of the  
7 Commission-determined CU4 fixed cost of service.

8 **Q. HAS ACTUAL CU4 SUPPLY EXCEEDED THE AMOUNT THAT**  
9 **WAS ANTICIPATED BY THE COMPANY AND THE**  
10 **COMMISSION IN DOCKET D2008.6.69?**

11 A. No. Beginning in April of 2009 and continuing through the present, CU4  
12 has experienced a lengthy and unexpected outage, and generation supply  
13 from the plant has been, and is now expected to be, significantly lower in  
14 the 2008/2009 and 2009/2010 tracker years than the Company and  
15 Commission anticipated in Docket D2008.6.69. Reduced sales of CU4  
16 production are attributable to this outage, not to DSM. The lost sales that  
17 the Company attributes to DSM are from all sources of supply, including  
18 replacement market purchases that consumers are funding to make up for  
19 the CU4 outage, as well as incremental supplies to serve post-2007 test year  
20 sales growth. Since the Company derives its CU4 fixed cost of service

1 recovery from a surcharge on all sales (not just sales of CU4 output) and, as  
2 NorthWestern contends, DSM has reduced these total kwh sales from what  
3 they might have been without DSM, the Company is requesting a tracker  
4 adjustment for additional CU4 revenue, even though total kwh sales have  
5 increased from the 2007 test year amount and the Company is therefore  
6 already recovering more than the \$75,832,029 CU4 fixed cost of service as  
7 determined by the Commission in Docket D2008.6.69.

8 An alternative point of view may be that since the Company is already  
9 collecting more than the Commission's determined CU4 fixed cost of  
10 service, providing for further additional CU4 revenue in the tracker is  
11 unnecessary. The requested revenue increment might also be deemed  
12 inappropriate in view of the plant's extended outage and the fact that  
13 consumers are already paying the costs of additional replacement supply to  
14 make up for the outage, and their revenues are already more than covering  
15 the full CU4 fixed cost of service.

16 **V. INCLUDING IN-HOUSE LABOR COSTS IN THE TRACKER**

17 **Q. IS THE COMPANY OFFERING A NEW PROPOSAL TO BEGIN**  
18 **INCLUDING CERTAIN IN-HOUSE LABOR COSTS IN THE**  
19 **TRACKER?**

1 A. Yes. Until the end of 2008 the Company contracted with outside  
2 consultants to perform the real time scheduling for its power supply  
3 requirements. The costs of these consulting services were included as  
4 administrative expenses in the Company's tracker filings through 2008. At  
5 the end of 2008 (December 28), the Company began performing the  
6 required real time scheduling for its system with its own employees.  
7 Relatedly, it also made offers to several of the former consultant's  
8 employees to become company employees. The Company is now  
9 proposing to include its allocated internal labor and administration costs of  
10 real time scheduling as tracker costs.

11 **Q. WOULD THIS BE A SIGNIFICANT CHANGE?**

12 A. Yes. NorthWestern has never before recovered any of its own internal  
13 labor or administrative costs associated with energy supply through its  
14 tracker filings.

15 **Q. HAS THE COMPANY PREVIOUSLY PROPOSED TO RECOVER**  
16 **SUCH INTERNAL LABOR AND OVERHEAD COSTS**  
17 **ASSOCIATED WITH ENERGY SUPPLY THROUGH ITS**  
18 **TRACKER FILINGS?**

19 A. Yes. In Docket No. D2005.5.88 the Company proposed to include staff  
20 labor costs associated with new DSM program employees in its electric

1 tracker revenues. In that case, I testified that these kinds of intermittent  
2 increments to staff positions between rate cases are inappropriate for  
3 tracker rate adjustments since they single out one test year cost component  
4 that has increased, while ignoring offsetting changes, such as labor  
5 productivity gains or other employee reductions that cause costs to fall. It  
6 is inconsistent with long established test year ratemaking principles, as well  
7 as one-sided and unfair to consumers, to increase rates between rate cases  
8 to account for employee additions but to make no corresponding  
9 adjustments for employee eliminations or productivity gains. Such a  
10 practice would undermine the essential balancing feature of comprehensive  
11 rate cases and impose an uneven ratemaking mechanism between rate cases  
12 that surcharges consumers for interim changes that cause costs to rise but  
13 fails to credit them for changes that cause costs to fall. That would  
14 undermine and destroy sound and venerable ratemaking procedures that  
15 have been carefully developed, implemented and upheld by regulators over  
16 many decades. It would also motivate regulated utilities to avoid and delay  
17 important general rate investigations, which look evenhandedly at all cost  
18 and price changes, in favor of one-sided interim procedures that track cost  
19 increases but not reductions.

20 **Q. DID THE COMMISSION AGREE WITH THE ARGUMENTS TO**  
21 **THIS EFFECT IN DOCKET NO. D2005.5.88?**

1 A. Yes. In Final Order No. 6682d, the Commission stated:

2 “MCC argued that it is inconsistent with long established test year  
3 ratemaking principles to attempt to increase rates between rate cases  
4 to account for employee additions but to make no corresponding  
5 adjustments for employee reductions. NWE stated that the position  
6 would be solely dedicated to the acquisition of DSM resources for  
7 the default supply portfolio. Labor costs for other employees  
8 involved in acquiring default supply resources are not included in  
9 electricity supply costs. The Commission finds that the labor  
10 charges associated with the DSM Program Coordinator should not  
11 be recovered through the electric tracker. Rather those costs should  
12 be considered in a general rate case. NWE’s request to include labor  
13 expense of \$52,070 for the position of DSM is not approved for  
14 inclusion in the electric tracker. NWE is free to file for approval of  
15 the labor expense associated with the DSM Program Coordinator in  
16 its next general rate case.”

17 **Q. SHOULD THE COMMISSION CONTINUE TO UPHOLD THESE**  
18 **SAME REGULATORY PRINCIPLES IN THIS CASE?**

19 A. Yes. In this case the Company has advised that it will be making a general  
20 rate case filing very soon. Issues regarding internal staff labor costs should

1 be considered in a comprehensive and balanced way in this general rate  
2 case filing and should not be recovered through the electric tracker.

3 If, in view of the fact that real time scheduling costs were included in the  
4 tracker while these functions were performed by consultants, the  
5 Commission nevertheless determines that it is fair to provide NorthWestern  
6 with additional scheduling cost compensation for the in-house period prior  
7 to the time that new general rate case rates become effective, such bridge  
8 compensation should be limited to \$27,000 per month since that is the  
9 tracker cost amount that the consultant (Highland Energy) was being paid  
10 through December 28, 2008. This is less than the labor cost that  
11 NorthWestern is claiming in this case for the period in which its own  
12 employees have taken over real time scheduling.

13 **VI. FINANCIAL SWAPS**

14 **Q. IS NORTHWESTERN REQUESTING THAT THE COMMISSION**  
15 **APPROVE ITS USE OF FINANCIAL SWAPS (“FIXED-FOR-**  
16 **FLOAT”) TO PROCURE ELECTRIC SUPPLIES TO BE**  
17 **INCLUDED IN FUTURE TRACKER FILINGS?**

18 A. Yes.

19 **Q. HOW WOULD THESE FINANCIAL SWAPS WORK?**

1 A. The financial swaps that NorthWestern is proposing in this case are  
2 financial derivative transactions. Under such fixed-for-float deals  
3 NorthWestern would agree to pay another party a negotiated fixed price  
4 associated with a specified quantity of electricity in a specified future time  
5 period. At the same time, the other party would agree to pay NorthWestern  
6 the actual market price in that future time period for the same specified  
7 quantity of electricity. These would be purely financial transactions  
8 (financial hedges) without any physical sales of electricity actually taking  
9 place. Thus, if the negotiated price is \$50/Mwh and the market price in the  
10 future period turns out to be \$30/Mwh, NorthWestern would pay the other  
11 party the net amount of \$20 for each Mwh of the specified contract  
12 quantity. In that case, whereas NorthWestern would be able to buy actual  
13 physical quantities of electricity for \$30/Mwh, the effective cost, including  
14 the swap payment of \$20/Mwh, would increase to \$50/Mwh. Conversely, if  
15 the negotiated price is \$50/Mwh and the market price in the future period  
16 turns out to be \$70/Mwh, NorthWestern would collect the \$20 net amount  
17 from the other party for each Mwh of the specified contract quantity. In  
18 that case, NorthWestern would use the \$20/Mwh that it collects from the  
19 other party to offset the \$70 market price that it actually pays for physical  
20 quantities of electricity so as to reduce the effective cost from \$70 to \$50.  
21 In this illustration, the effective cost of electricity is \$50/Mwh in both cases

1 even though the actual market cost ranged from \$30/Mwh to \$70/Mwh. Of  
2 course, it is unlikely in the real world that winning and losing swaps will  
3 exactly offset each other, and the counter parties who would do the swaps  
4 with NorthWestern are highly sophisticated and practiced trading experts  
5 who are not in business to break even.

6 **Q. HAS NORTHWESTERN ESTABLISHED A TRACK RECORD**  
7 **USING FINANCIAL SWAPS IN CONJUNCTION WITH ITS**  
8 **NATURAL GAS SUPPLY ACTIVITIES?**

9 A. Yes. Mr. Markovich testifies in this case that NorthWestern uses financial  
10 swaps in its Montana natural gas supply function and that they have worked  
11 exactly as expected in that they have reduced the impacts of market price  
12 volatility on the Company's natural gas supply rates.

13 **Q. DO YOU AGREE THAT FINANCIAL SWAPS HAVE WORKED**  
14 **WELL FOR THE COMPANY AS REGARDS GAS SUPPLY?**

15 A. That depends on how one defines "working well." If, as Mr. Markovich  
16 suggests, working well means reducing the impact of price volatility, one  
17 may be able to reach that conclusion. However, if "working well" means  
18 reducing costs for consumers, things have not worked out that way for  
19 NorthWestern's gas customers. As shown in response to data request  
20 MCC-037(a), NorthWestern's natural gas fixed-for-float transactions

1           resulted in net payments by NorthWestern to counter parties of \$11.0  
2           million from November, 2007 through June, 2009, increasing the cost of  
3           the gas covered by these swaps by \$3.07/MMBtu or 55.7%. Looking at a  
4           longer period, my colleague, George L. Donkin recently estimated that  
5           NorthWestern's fixed price deals resulted in above market gas costs of  
6           about \$26.9 million over the period November 2005 through June 2009.

7           In view of this track record on the gas side of NorthWestern's business, the  
8           Commission may think better than to give the Company the requested  
9           authority to engage in financial swaps in procuring electricity supplies. To  
10          the extent that further hedging is deemed desirable, future consideration  
11          might be given to the use of electricity call options, which would provide  
12          protection against extreme upside price movements at a known and limited  
13          cost and far less risk of the very large above market cost results that  
14          NorthWestern has encountered in its fixed-for-float gas price transactions.

15   **Q.   DOES   THIS   COMPLETE   YOUR   PREPARED   DIRECT**  
16   **TESTIMONY AT THIS TIME?**

17   **A.   Yes; it does.**