

**DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SERVICE REGULATION  
BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION  
OF THE STATE OF MONTANA**

IN THE MATTER OF Establishing Minimum  
Information Requirements for NorthWestern  
Energy’s Study of the Costs and Benefits of  
Customer Generation

REGULATORY DIVISION

DOCKET NO. D2017.6.49

**COMMENTS OF THE JOINT PARTIES**

**July 7, 2017**

1       **I. Introduction**

2       The Montana Renewable Energy Association, Renewable Northwest, the Montana  
3       Environmental Information Center, NW Energy Coalition, and Vote Solar, collectively  
4       the “Joint Parties” offer the following comments.

5       The Montana Renewable Energy Association (“MREA”) is a non-profit, membership  
6       based organization dedicated to expanding the use of renewable energy in Montana.  
7       MREA works to affect public policy in favor of renewable energy, and to educate and  
8       inform the residents of Montana of the benefits and uses of renewable energy.

9       Renewable Northwest is a non-profit advocacy organization that works to facilitate the  
10       development of a cost-effective, reliable, and clean energy system for the betterment of  
11       the Northwest economy and environment. We are actively engaged throughout the region  
12       in proceedings and discussions related to renewable energy. Of particular relevance to  
13       this proceeding, Renewable Northwest is working with a broad selection of stakeholders,  
14       including utilities, to quantify the benefits and costs of solar in Washington as part of the  
15       initiative Solar Plus. We are also an active stakeholder, and have provided extensive  
16       technical expertise, as part of the Oregon Public Utility Commission’s current  
17       Investigation into the Resource Value of Solar.

18       The Montana Environmental Information Center (“MEIC”) is a nonprofit environmental  
19       advocacy organization founded in 1973 by Montanans concerned with protecting and

1 restoring Montana's natural environment. MEIC plays an active role in promoting  
2 Montana clean energy projects and policies, including advocating for the expansion of  
3 responsible, renewable energy and energy efficiency and supporting policies that insulate  
4 energy consumers from fuel price risk. At the state level, MEIC works to pass policies  
5 that help expand clean, affordable, reliable, and efficient energy solutions for Montana.  
6 MEIC has approximately 5,000 members and supporters, many of whom are in  
7 NorthWestern's Montana service territory.

8 The NW Energy Coalition is an alliance of about 100 environmental, civic, and human  
9 service organizations, progressive utilities, and businesses in Oregon, Washington, Idaho,  
10 Montana and British Columbia. The NW Energy Coalition promotes development of  
11 renewable energy and energy conservation, consumer protection, low-income energy  
12 assistance, and fish and wildlife restoration on the Columbia and Snake rivers.

13 Vote Solar is a non-profit grassroots organization working to foster economic opportunity  
14 and promote environmental benefits by bringing solar energy into the mainstream. Since  
15 2002, Vote Solar has engaged at the state, local and federal levels of government to  
16 remove regulatory barriers and implement policies needed to bring solar to scale.

17 The Joint Parties thank the Public Service Commission ("Commission") for this  
18 opportunity to comment. By deciding to establish minimum information requirements for  
19 study of the costs and benefits of customer-generators, the Commission is taking an  
20 important first step to ensure a fair and transparent process for implementation of HB  
21 219.

22 In our comments below, the Joint Parties respond to the Notice of Opportunity to  
23 Comment ("NOC") dated June 16, 2017. Following this introduction, the second section  
24 of these comments provides recommendations of the Joint Parties. The third section  
25 addresses each of the benefit and cost categories identified in the NOC, and the fourth  
26 section provides responses to the additional questions listed in the NOC.

1       **II. Over-Arching Issues for Consideration**

2               **A. A Customer’s Right to Self-Determination**

3       Just as a customer has the right to grow and harvest timber on their own land to use for  
4       heating their home, a customer has the right to install distributed generation to serve their  
5       on-site energy needs. In this respect, the Joint Parties encourage the Commission to  
6       recognize that an individual customer should be free to choose the amount of energy to  
7       purchase from the grid, the amount to self-produce and consume, and the amount to save  
8       through efficiency measures that reduce consumption. This freedom includes the right to  
9       install solar generation equipment at the customer’s site and to interconnect to the utility  
10      grid without discrimination. While any electrical devices connected to the grid must not  
11      compromise safety, reliability, or power quality, utilities do not have the right to restrict  
12      the decisions of customers regarding how to manage energy use on their own property.  
13      Montana’s electric utilities operate under a regulatory compact that requires electric  
14      utilities to do business within the confines of the public interest to serve the needs of all  
15      customers within their territory in exchange for an exclusive monopoly franchise.

16     The program of net energy metering (“NEM”) recognizes the customer’s right to self-  
17     determination by allowing the customer-generator to avoid payments to the utility for  
18     energy generated and consumed on-site and billing the customer only for energy that is  
19     consumed from the utility. In this regard, NEM is a method for compensating the **exports**  
20     from a customer-generator, not the energy that is produced and consumed on-site. Under  
21     NEM, exported energy is “netted” against energy that is purchased from the utility,  
22     effectively valuing exported energy at the volumetric retail rate.

23     In addition to customers’ right to self-determination, Montana law requires that the utility  
24     compensate customer-generators for the excess energy that is fed to the grid: The net  
25     metering rules state: “If electricity generated by the customer-generator exceeds the  
26     electricity supplied by the electricity supplier, the customer-generator must be  
27     [...] credited for the excess kilowatt hours generated during the billing period.”<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> MT 69-8-603(3).

1 As the Commission undertakes the important question of evaluating the benefits and  
2 costs of customer-generators under the NEM program, the Joint Parties urge the  
3 Commission to avoid reaching “behind the meter” and to focus instead on evaluating: (1)  
4 the cost to serve customer-generators for the load that is delivered to them by the utility;  
5 and (2) the compensation for energy exported by the customer-generator.

6 **B. Role of Benefit-Cost Study in Relation to the Rate Case**

7 The benefit-cost study is an important tool for evaluating the impact of NEM as  
8 compensation for exported energy. Upon completion of the benefit-cost study it is the  
9 Joint Parties’ hope that the Commission will have available key information regarding the  
10 impacts of current policy that can help inform future policy to be set in the rate case. The  
11 Joint Parties do not believe that it is appropriate for the Commission to make changes to  
12 NEM, nor customer-generator classification in this rulemaking, but rather to reserve  
13 those questions for the rate case where they can be appropriately evaluated.

14 HB 219 instructs the Commission to evaluate whether customer-generators should be  
15 served under a separate classification of service, but indicates that this finding should  
16 take place “as part of a public utility’s general rate case.”<sup>2</sup> The results of the benefit-cost  
17 study alone are insufficient to inform such a finding. In addition to examining the results  
18 of the benefit-cost study, the Commission must evaluate the cost to serve customer-  
19 generators in the context of a full cost of service study. Only with a full assessment of  
20 facts can the Commission weigh the policy considerations surrounding whether or not to  
21 place customer-generators into a separate classification of service.

22 Considerations should include:

- 23 1. An assessment of the cost to serve customer-generators, relative to the benefits  
24 brought to the system, and also the revenue recovery from customer-generators in  
25 relation to similar measures for standard customers;

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<sup>2</sup> HB 219 Section 2.

- 1       2. The potential impact on customers with and without distributed generation, and  
2       whether the small size of a potential customer-generator class warrants separation;  
3       and
- 4       3. Whether the load and cost profiles of customer-generators are sufficiently  
5       different from other subclasses of customers such as multi-family residences,  
6       rural customers, or customers with electric heating so as to warrant singling out  
7       customer-generators in the rate-making process.

8       One of the primary challenges facing the Commission will be to gather the data on which  
9       to base its findings. In order to properly evaluate whether customer-generators should be  
10      served under a separate classification of service, the utility must gather detailed load  
11      information on its customer-generators to determine the relative cost to serve them. We  
12      encourage the Commission to instruct the utility to evaluate the cost-causing factors  
13      associated with load delivered to customer-generators in a manner consistent with how  
14      other service classes are treated in the cost of service study. The Joint Parties note that the  
15      Commission has requested that NorthWestern Energy (“NWE”) provide information on  
16      the scale and scope of data that will be available in this regard, and we look forward to  
17      working with the Commission and NWE on this issue.

### 18                   **C. Scope of the Benefit-Cost Study**

19      The Joint Parties note that HB 219 has authorized the Commission to establish the  
20      minimum information to be included in NWE's study of benefits and costs of customer-  
21      generators, but has not limited consideration to a single type of customer-generator. At  
22      the end of 2014 there were roughly 1,400 customer-generators in NWE's territory, nearly  
23      1,300 of which have adopted rooftop PV generation.<sup>3</sup> While rooftop solar is the leading  
24      distributed energy resource [“DER”] adopted to-date, the Joint Parties encourage the  
25      Commission to consider other DERs such as net metered wind, hydro, energy storage,  
26      and electric vehicles in addition to rooftop solar PV when formulating policy in this  
27      regard.

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<sup>3</sup> <http://montanarenewables.org/maps-data/net-metering/nwe/>

1                   **D. Draft Study Should be Made Available for Comment**

2     While the Joint Parties appreciate the procedural timelines set forth in HB 219, we  
3     recommend that the Commission require NWE to submit a draft benefit-cost study for  
4     evaluation and input from interested parties. The draft should include a full description of  
5     the methodologies employed and provision of associated work-papers and source data for  
6     evaluation by interested parties. We recommend that the Commission require a public  
7     draft of the study and work-papers by February 1, 2018 and allow for interested parties to  
8     submit comments by March 1, 2018. This would provide NWE the opportunity to  
9     respond to comments in the final draft by the April 1, 2018 deadline set forth in HB 219.

10    Draft review prior to final submittal would provide transparency in the study. This  
11    recommendation is furthered by confusion regarding the process immediately following  
12    submittal of the study on or before April 1, 2018. HB 219 Section 1(b) states that a public  
13    utility shall “submit the study to the commission for the purpose of making  
14    determinations in accordance with a public utility’s general rate case pursuant to [Section  
15    2].” Section 2, subsection 4 states, “If a public utility files a general rate case in  
16    accordance with Title 69, Chapter 3, the general rate case must include the study required  
17    in accordance with [Section 1] and be used by the commission to meet the requirements  
18    of the review of classifications of service required in this section.”

19    The Commission NOC, however, states, “NWE must submit the study to the Public  
20    Service Commission (PSC) as part of a general rate application.” If this were true, any  
21    and all interested parties would be able to support, oppose or otherwise contest the study  
22    solely by hiring legal counsel and formally intervening in the general rate case. This  
23    presents both an undue burden on interested parties and presents significant challenges to  
24    completing the rate case in the allotted 270 days, especially considering that NWE will  
25    not have filed an electric general rate case in nearly a decade.

26    The Joint Parties do not interpret the statute to require a general rate case filing upon  
27    submittal of the benefit-cost study. As such, if the Commission rejects the notion of draft  
28    study evaluation prior to final submittal, we recommend that the study be reviewed by the  
29    Commission and interested parties as part of a separate docket outside of and prior to the

1 general rate case application. This process would enable all parties to fully examine the  
2 study and provide feedback as to its merit prior to its inclusion in a rate case. Should the  
3 study be found to be of merit, the rate case, then, could focus on potential changes to rate  
4 design. Should the study be found to be delinquent, we recommend that the Commission  
5 encourage NWE not to include the study as part of a general rate application until any  
6 and all flaws are fixed.

### 7 **III. Recommendations for Minimum Information Requirements**

8 The NOC includes tables of benefit and cost categories identified for potential inclusion  
9 in a set of minimum information requirements. The section below addresses each of these  
10 categories. In evaluating appropriate categories for inclusion, the Joint Parties find that it  
11 is best to cast a broad net for the study and evaluate which categories yield useful  
12 information. If there is concern over the ability to quantify a particular benefit or cost  
13 category, it should not be excluded from the evaluation. The Joint Parties recommend  
14 that, rather than adopt a zero value for more advanced categories, the Commission  
15 identify the category and consider it qualitatively based on available evidence. In  
16 addition, we encourage the Commission to consider what information prevents the  
17 quantification of that category and consider requiring development of the necessary  
18 information to enable quantification in a future examination.

19 As the Commission begins this process it can be helpful to look to the experience of other  
20 states that have undertaken similar efforts. The Interstate Renewable Energy Council  
21 (“IREC”) has developed a useful guidebook on calculating the costs and benefits of  
22 distributed solar generation that can inform the Commission’s process.<sup>4</sup> The guidebook  
23 builds on experiences throughout the country to propose a standardized and reliable  
24 approach to the analysis.

25 The table below summarizes our comments on each benefit-cost category.

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<sup>4</sup> IREC, *A Regulator’s Guidebook: Calculating the Benefits and Costs of Distributed Solar Generation* (Oct. 2013), <http://www.irecusa.org/publications/a-regulators-guidebook-calculating-the-benefits-and-costs-of-distributed-solar-generation/>

Category	Include	Key factors for consideration
<b>Benefits</b>		
Avoided Energy Costs	Yes	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Use marginal costs</li> <li>• Account for seasonality when identifying marginal generator (DG exports vary during the year)</li> </ul>
Avoided Capacity Costs	Yes	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Use marginal costs</li> <li>• Quantify based on DER contribution to capacity needs</li> </ul>
Avoided Transmission and Distribution Capacity Costs	Yes	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Use publically available data on historical expenditures</li> <li>• Quantify based on DER contribution to capacity needs</li> </ul>
Avoided System Losses	Yes	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Use marginal losses</li> <li>• Account for seasonality (DG exports can coincide with periods of high loading)</li> </ul>
Avoided RPS Compliance Costs	Yes	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Use the premium NWE has paid for renewable generation</li> </ul>
Avoided Environmental Compliance Costs	Yes	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Value both avoided particulate and carbon emissions</li> <li>• Include to the extent not captured in Avoided Energy or RPS Compliance costs</li> </ul>
Market Price Suppression Effects	Yes	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Consider effects on both energy and capacity</li> <li>• Model as the difference between total cost paid with and without DER generation / capacity</li> </ul>
Avoided Risk	Yes	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Quantify “risk premium” as the difference between cost of energy procured through the market and that locked-in via futures contracts</li> </ul>
Avoided Grid Support Services	Yes	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Assume capability of current inverter technology is utilized to provide grid support services in future scenarios</li> </ul>
Avoided Outages Costs	Yes	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Include qualitatively if data does not allow quantification</li> </ul>
Non-Energy Benefits	Yes	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Include at least three categories – local economic benefits, reduced water usage, and public health benefits</li> </ul>
<b>Costs</b>		
Reduced Revenue	No	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Exclude from analysis because utilities do not have a right to the revenue.</li> <li>• If the Commission includes this element, consider all DER systems including commercial and industrial, not just residential, and account for proportion of energy forfeited to utility annually under NEM arrangement</li> </ul>
Administrative Costs	Yes	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Include costs for billing and administration</li> <li>• Exclude marketing, advertising and market research</li> </ul>
Interconnection	See comments	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Most germane to expected interconnection docket</li> </ul>
Integration	Yes	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Unlikely to result in material cost for some period of time</li> </ul>
Production, Transmission, Distribution Cost Shifts	No	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Fully accounted for in other categories</li> </ul>

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1           **A. Avoided Energy Costs**

2       Generation from DER systems offsets energy that would otherwise have been produced  
3       by the marginal generator. Properly valuing avoided energy costs from DER thus requires  
4       (1) identifying a representative marginal generator – DER production will vary  
5       seasonally, based on the coincidence of customers’ usage and solar production, as will  
6       NWE’s plant stack – and then applying reasonable (2) heat rate, (3) operations and  
7       maintenance costs and (4) gas price assumptions.

8           **B. Avoided Capacity Costs**

9       DERs are capable of contributing a degree of firm capacity that reduces the need for new  
10       build to meet NWE's planned system capacity needs. Valuing avoided capacity costs  
11       attributable to DER requires (1) an assessment of current and forecast capacity  
12       requirements, (2) the marginal cost NWE has assessed to build new capacity and (3) a  
13       measure of the contribution of DER to NWE's capacity requirements that should be  
14       estimated using an effective load carrying capability method (“ELCC”) or a recognized  
15       approximation to the ELCC that considers all hours of the year.

16           **C. Avoided Transmission and Distribution Capacity Costs**

17       The Joint Parties recommend quantifying the avoided cost attributable to new  
18       transmission and distribution capacity. Ideally, these avoided costs would be  
19       accomplished through marginal cost studies developed in conjunction with detailed  
20       distribution and transmission resource planning; however, it is unlikely that such data is  
21       currently available for NWE’s system. Hence, the Joint Parties recommend  
22       approximating these measures through the NERA regression method whereby historical  
23       expenditures on transmission and distribution can be compared to measures of increases  
24       in demand and scaled to account for the expected contribution of DER to the factors  
25       driving transmission and distribution investment. The benefit of this approach is that it  
26       relies on publically available data and can be conducted even in the absence of detailed  
27       marginal cost information.

1                   **D. Avoided System Losses**

2   Because DG systems offset load at the source, their production avoids line losses  
3   associated with carrying centralized generation to the point of consumption, creating  
4   greater efficiency in the system overall. The Joint Parties recommend using an  
5   assessment of marginal, rather than average, line losses, ideally accounting for seasonal  
6   differences. DG generation can be greatest during periods of high loading on the grid at  
7   which times lines losses may be considerably higher than average.

8   Line losses should be accounted for when calculating avoided energy, capacity, and  
9   transmission and distribution costs, as 1MW of DER capacity will be able to offset more  
10  than a MW in centralized capacity, which must be oversized to account for power lost  
11  over the transmission and distribution systems.

12                   **E. Avoided RPS Compliance Costs**

13  Montana’s Renewable Resource Standard requires investor-owned utilities to procure  
14  15% of retail electricity sales from qualified renewable energy resources for compliance  
15  in year 2015 onward. By reducing the volume of retail sales, DER generation reduces the  
16  amount NWE is required to spend on RPS compliance. The value of avoided RPS  
17  compliance costs can be assessed based on the premium NWE has paid for qualified  
18  renewable energy contracts. A simple proxy value for this premium would be the price of  
19  any RECs NWE has put on the market for purchase. Because DER generation lessens the  
20  total amount of renewable generation NWE needs to procure and creates the ability for  
21  NWE to sell excess credits in its possession, it is appropriate to award this value  
22  regardless of NWE's overall RPS compliance position or REC procurement.

23                   **F. Avoided Environmental Compliance Costs**

24  DER generation directly reduces the amount of criteria pollutants produced by the  
25  utility’s resources, including NOx, SOx, and other particulate matter. The avoided  
26  operating expenses for the utility should be valued to the extent that these compliance  
27  costs are not captured in the Avoided Energy Cost and Avoided RPS Compliance Cost,

1 and the volume of avoided emissions should be calculated based on the emission rate of  
2 the marginal generator identified.

3 In addition, a carbon avoidance value should be awarded to DER generation, consistent  
4 with precedent set in previous Commission dockets.<sup>5</sup>

### 5 **G. Market Price Suppression Effects**

6 DER generation reduces total system load, which can reduce the overall market price for  
7 all other purchased energy by shifting to lower-cost marginal generators. This benefit is  
8 difficult to measure directly, especially in a regulated wholesale environment, but can be  
9 modeled by first analyzing what market energy prices would have been with and without  
10 DER, and then multiplying this change in price by the volume of DER generation. A  
11 similar capacity value should also be quantified.

### 12 **H. Avoided Risk**

13 DER exports act as a fuel price hedge, reducing the utility's reliance on fuels with  
14 volatile and uncertain market prices. The benefit of removing this "risk premium" can be  
15 quantified as the cost to remove natural gas price uncertainty for the given volume of  
16 DER generation. This can be accomplished by comparing the cost to procure generation  
17 from a gas plant in which there is fuel price uncertainty, and one in which gas futures  
18 have been secured and funds invested today in risk-free securities. The resulting  
19 difference should be quantified for the duration of the DER lifetime. Due to NWE's  
20 relatively high exposure to market prices, this may be a significant value stream. As a  
21 result, we recommend that the Commission include Avoided Risk in its minimum  
22 information requirements.

### 23 **I. Avoided Grid Support Services**

24 DER capacity is able to provide support services to the grid, such as VAR regulation and  
25 voltage pass-through. However, its ability to do so largely depends on policy that requires  
26 advanced inverter standards upon interconnection, such as those put in place in states

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<sup>5</sup> See Dockets D2013.215 and D2016.7.56.

1 such as Hawaii and California. The Joint Parties recommend that, in assessing avoided  
2 grid support services over the term of the study, the full functionality of currently  
3 available inverter technology is utilized by DER systems rather than limiting value to the  
4 services provided by outdated technology that may already be in place for early adopters.

5 **J. Avoided Outages Costs**

6 DER can increase the resiliency of the grid by reducing the risk of outages by decreasing  
7 load requirements on saturated circuits and, if behind-the-meter storage is present,  
8 allowing customers to continue to use power on-site in the case of an outage. The Joint  
9 Parties recommend quantifying this benefit to the extent NWE's data allows.

10 **K. Non-Energy Benefits**

11 The Joint Parties recommend quantifying at least three primary non-energy benefits of  
12 DER: (1) local economic benefits, including increased tax revenue and job creation (2)  
13 reduced water usage and (3) the public health benefits of decreased airborne pollutants.

14 **L. Reduced Revenue**

15 The Joint Parties recommend that the Commission does not include Reduced Revenue in  
16 the minimum information requirements for NWE's study because it is not a cost of  
17 customer-generators. HB 219 requires NWE to conduct a study of the costs and benefits  
18 of customer-generators.<sup>6</sup> The NOC includes Reduced Revenue as one of the cost  
19 categories for potential inclusion in the set of minimum information requirements,  
20 defining it as, "Lost utility revenue associated with reduced sales due to net metering".<sup>7</sup>  
21 However, the revenue that a utility does not receive from customers that reduce their  
22 load, including customer-generators, is not a cost of that customer. Indeed, a utility does  
23 not have a right to expect its customers to consume electricity at a set level. Utility  
24 customers may reduce their load as a result of several factors, including self-generators,  
25 but also energy efficiency, and should not be penalized for doing so. A study of the costs  
26 and benefits of customer-generators that includes Reduced Revenue as a cost would rely

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<sup>6</sup> HB 219, Section 1.

<sup>7</sup> NOC at 3.

1 on the assumption that utilities have a right to their customers consuming electricity at a  
2 particular level. As a result, a study that included Reduced Revenue would offer  
3 inaccurate information on the actual costs and benefits of customer-generators.

4 The Joint Parties recommend the Commission does not consider Reduced Revenues  
5 when determining if customer-generators should be classified separately from other  
6 customers. Under HB 219, the Commission must determine if customer-generators  
7 should be classified separately from other customers based on the utility system benefits  
8 and the costs of serving customer-generators. However, the reduction in revenue a utility  
9 experiences as a result of customers reducing their load is not a cost of serving those  
10 customers. As a result, we recommend that the Commission does not consider Reduced  
11 Revenue when determining if customer-generators should be classified separately from  
12 other customers.

13 If the Commission decides to include Reduced Revenue in the minimum information  
14 requirements, or if NWE decides to use this element, the Joint Parties recommend that  
15 Reduced Revenue be calculated as the volume of exports from DER systems multiplied  
16 by the retail rate credit applied under NEM, and should not include the amount of self-  
17 generated energy consumed behind the meter. Additionally, the analysis should consider  
18 all customer classes with DER systems, including commercial and industrial, not only  
19 residential. Because commercial and industrial rates often utilize a demand charge,  
20 which cannot be offset by solar-only systems, and feature a lower volumetric energy rate  
21 relative to residential tariffs, excluding commercial and industrial classes, therefore,  
22 would overstate the average cost of exports across the DER fleet. When scaling the costs  
23 associated with reduced revenue to the benefits categories identified above, the study  
24 should incorporate the proportion of energy from customer-generators that is forfeited to  
25 the utility without compensation under the current NEM program.

## 26 **M. Administrative Costs**

27 Direct costs associated with billing and basic administration regarding DER generators  
28 are within the scope of this study. These include the one-time costs associated with  
29 setting up and verifying applications, as well as the on-going expenses of administering

1 the program (such as manually adjusting customer bills). When forecasting, the Joint  
2 Parties recommend assuming that administrative practices and processes are automated as  
3 penetration of DER increases, thereby reducing the marginal cost of maintaining the  
4 program.

5 While identified in the NOC, marketing, advertising and market research costs are not  
6 direct costs required to support customer-generators. As a result, the Joint Parties do not  
7 recommend including these discretionary cost items within the scope of the study.

#### 8 **N. Interconnection**

9 Interconnection costs incurred by the utility should be considered to the extent that they  
10 are incremental to any fees the DER customer pays at interconnection. Currently, NWE  
11 does not collect mandatory fees at interconnection, but is in the process of updating their  
12 interconnection agreements and is expected to file in the near future. The updated  
13 agreements may require the customer generator to cover fees for application, feasibility  
14 studies, meter upgrades and any other interconnection cost.

15 Pending an outcome from the interconnection docket, we encourage the Commission to  
16 ensure that interconnection costs are not double-counted in the study. It is critical that, on  
17 a forward-looking basis, the only costs considered in this study are distinct items that  
18 NWE incurs above and beyond those recovered from the DER customer.

#### 19 **O. Integration**

20 Given the relatively low penetration of DER in Montana, it is unlikely that NWE will  
21 experience any costs associated with integration in the near term. Notably, a recent  
22 National Laboratory report found that rooftop solar is expected to account for far less  
23 than 0.5% of sales in Montana in 2030.<sup>8</sup> The Joint Parties recommend that integration  
24 costs be recognized as a potential issue in the future, but highlight that it would be  
25 premature to give the category much weight given long-term penetration forecasts.

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<sup>8</sup> Barbose, Galen. Putting the Potential Rate Impacts of Distributed Solar into Context. Energy Analysis and Environmental Impacts Division. Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory. LBNL-1007060. January 2017, page 11.

1           **P. Production, Transmission, Distribution Cost Shifts**

2 While the Joint Parties agree that the question of whether cost-shifts exist is an important  
3 issue for the Commission to consider, this issue will be fully addressed through an  
4 accounting of the benefits and costs listed above and through further analysis in the cost  
5 of service study during the rate case. As a result, this issue does not require separate  
6 quantification. Whether and to what extent a cost shift may or may not occur will depend  
7 on the balance of identified benefits and costs, and should be considered an outcome of—  
8 rather than input to—the study.

9           **IV. Responses to Additional Questions Identified in the NOC**

- 10           • **What, if any, assumptions regarding the adoption rate of solar or other net**  
11           **metering technologies should the Commission specify?**

12           The amount of DER on a utility’s system can significantly impact the benefits and  
13 costs of DER, and the benefit-cost equation can therefore change as DER penetration  
14 levels increase. While it can be informative to examine the value of DER at higher  
15 levels of penetration, long-term adoption rates are highly uncertain, and the  
16 economics of DER at high penetration levels does not impact the economics of DER  
17 at current and near-term levels. Therefore, hypothetical long-term penetration levels  
18 should not influence current policy. For purposes of this analysis, the Joint Parties  
19 recommend DER benefits and costs be evaluated at penetration levels expected to  
20 occur in the next one to three years and to revisit that valuation periodically as the  
21 market grows.

- 22           • **What, if any, time frame for calculating benefits and costs should the**  
23           **Commission specify (e.g., 10 years, 20 years, etc.)?**

24           We recommend that the Commission examine the levelized costs and benefits of  
25 DERs over the economic life of the asset. For rooftop PV, this is generally considered  
26 to be twenty to thirty years. This approach is inherently distinct from cost-of-service  
27 ratemaking, which looks at a single test year, but is consistent with the methodologies

1 used for evaluating other generation technologies such as through the Resource  
2 Procurement Plan, which looks at a 20-year period.

- 3 • **What, if any, assumptions regarding utility rates should the Commission**  
4 **specify (e.g., rate of increase, changes in rate design (time-of-use, other))?**

5 While the Joint Parties do not recommend that reduced revenue be included in the  
6 minimum information requirements, if it is included it will be necessary to make an  
7 assumption about the rate of increase in utility rates over the study period. However, we  
8 recommend that the Commission does not examine potential changes to rate design in the  
9 benefit-cost study. Rate design is a topic that should be evaluated in the context of the  
10 rate case. The purpose of the benefit-cost study is to evaluate current policy, not to weigh  
11 alternative rate designs.

- 12 • **What, if any, methodology for cost-effectiveness tests should the Commission**  
13 **specify (e.g., standard practice manual or the Cost Benefit Framework**  
14 **developed by the Electric Power Research Institute)?**

15 The California Standard Practice Manual (“SPM”) provides the basic framework for cost-  
16 effectiveness of energy efficiency, distributed generation resources, and electric vehicles  
17 throughout the Northwest. As such, we recommend that the utility and the Commission  
18 rely on this often-used methodology as a starting point for examining cost-effectiveness.  
19 Tweaks should be considered as needed; specifically, for the purposes of this study,  
20 certain societal and environmental costs should be included in any of the cost-  
21 effectiveness tests laid out in the SPM.

- 22 • **What cost-effectiveness perspective(s) should the Commission require be**  
23 **evaluated (e.g., societal, utility/program administrator, ratepayer,**  
24 **participant)?**

25 Considering the debate at the legislature and the Commission on the existence of a “cost-  
26 shift,” it is assumed that NorthWestern Energy would utilize the Ratepayer Impact  
27 Measure (“RIM”) test. As stated by the California SPM, “The Ratepayer Impact Measure



1 (RIM) test measures what happens to customer bill or rates due to changes in utility  
2 revenues and operating costs caused by the program.”<sup>9</sup>

3 However, as outlined in Commission’s Draft Minimum Information Requirements, and in  
4 these comments, we recommend that the Commission be sure to include costs beyond  
5 those typically included in RIM as outlined by the SPM if the RIM is used. Indeed, one  
6 of the downfalls of the RIM is its lack of inputs, which can lead to inconclusive results.  
7 Jim Lazar and Ken Colburn of the Regulatory Assistance Project highlight some of the  
8 problems with RIM in discussing its use for energy efficiency programs:

9       Very few, if any, states use the RIM test as the primary determinant of  
10       cost-effectiveness for their energy efficiency programs, in part because it  
11       can easily foster counterproductive outcomes. For example, a program to  
12       install **less efficient** air conditioners would increase electricity  
13       consumption, thereby reducing utility fixed costs per kWh and reducing  
14       overall rates as a result. Accordingly, such an energy **inefficiency** program  
15       would pass the RIM test.<sup>[10]</sup>

16 The CA SPM also notes an important weakness of the RIM: “Results of the RIM test are  
17 probably less certain than those of other tests because the test is sensitive to the  
18 differences between long-term projections of marginal costs and long-term projections of  
19 rates, two cost streams that are difficult to quantify with certainty.”<sup>11</sup>”

20 As such, and in order to capture a complete picture of the costs and benefits of  
21 distributed generation, we encourage the Commission to require that each of the tests laid  
22 out in the SPM be included in the study (Total Resource Cost (“TRC”)/Societal Cost Test  
23 (“SCT”), Program Administrator Cost (“PAC”) [also known as the Utility Cost Test  
24 (“UCT”)], RIM, and Participant Cost Test (“PCT”). Weight should be placed on the

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<sup>9</sup> *California Standard Practice Manual, Economic Analysis of Demand-Side Programs and Projects*, California Public Utilities Commission, October, 2001.  
[http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/uploadedFiles/CPUC\\_Public\\_Website/Content/Utilities\\_and\\_Industries/Energy\\_-](http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/uploadedFiles/CPUC_Public_Website/Content/Utilities_and_Industries/Energy_-Electricity_and_Natural_Gas/CPUC_STANDARD_PRACTICE_MANUAL.pdf)

<sup>10</sup> Lazar, J. and Colburn, K. (2013) *Recognizing the Full Value of Energy Efficiency (What’s Under the Feel-Good Frosting of the World’s Most Valuable Layer Cake of Benefits)*. Regulatory Assistance Project. [Emphasis added].

<sup>11</sup> *California Standard Practice Manual, Economic Analysis of Demand-Side Programs and Projects*, California Public Utilities Commission, October, 2001.

1 TRC/SCT and the PAC/UCT, as these test most accurately capture all of the costs and  
2 benefits of a demand-side program. This approach is consistent with the use of these tests  
3 by other Northwest utilities. The Northwest Power and Conservation Council’s Regional  
4 Technical Forum also follows this methodology, including each of the tests in its ProCost  
5 model for energy efficiency, while relying on the TRC to provide the most complete  
6 results.

7       • **Should the Commission specify the generating resource avoided by net-**  
8       **metered systems? If so, what generating unit should be used?**

9 While imperfect, we recommend that the Commission continue to use the proxy model as  
10 used in PURPA avoided cost dockets. Considering that the vast majority of net-metered  
11 systems are solar PV, providing power during NWEs heavy load hours, we encourage the  
12 Commission to specify a combined cycle natural gas turbine as the marginal energy  
13 resource. Solar PV also provides additional capacity benefits, especially during NWEs  
14 secondary peak during the summer months of July and August. As such, a natural gas  
15 internal combustion engine should provide marginal cost for these additional capacity  
16 benefits. Both of these resources were identified in NWEs 2015 Resource Procurement  
17 Plan as the marginal units for providing energy and capacity, respectively.

18       • **Should the Commission specify a particular locational attribute that counts**  
19       **as either a benefit or cost adder/subtractor?**

20 Because the value of DER can vary by location on the distribution system, the Joint  
21 Parties recommend that the Commission consider locational attributes. By incorporating  
22 locational attributes into the analysis, the Commission can enable DER deployment in a  
23 manner that is most efficient. Unfortunately, it appears as though NWE may lack  
24 sufficient information about its distribution system that would enable it to identify areas  
25 in which DER could be most effective in avoiding the need for infrastructure upgrades.  
26 As a result, the Joint Parties recommend that the Commission examine possible need for  
27 additional data development and potential hosting capacity analysis that can enable  
28 implementation of locational adders in the future.

- 1       • **What, if any, other compensation approaches in addition to net metering**  
2           **should be assessed in the study NorthWestern is required to conduct?**

3       The purpose of the benefit-cost study is to examine the current policy of net metering.  
4       While the result of the study may inform the need to evaluate other compensation  
5       approaches in a future proceeding, the first order of business is to develop a full  
6       understanding of the current policy. HB 219 has set time limitations on this exercise and  
7       the Joint Parties believe that increasing the scope of the study beyond current policy  
8       would water down the effectiveness of the study.

9       **V. Closing Comments**

10      The Joint Parties thank the Commission for their time and consideration of these  
11      comments and look forward to continuing the conversation in this rulemaking.